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The ongoing U.S. trade deficit in automobiles and automobile parts remains a 
central focus of trade disputes between the United States and Japan. There are 
many margins on which this deficit could change. These include export vol- 
umes, production location, and domestic product content. However, this deficit 
has continued, despite large changes in the  assembly pattern  of  U.S.-pur- 
chased automobiles. For example, in  1994, the United States purchased 2.69 
million Japanese nameplate automobiles. This was roughly the same number 
as the 2.78 million purchased in  1990. However, 1.45 million, or 54 percent, 
of the vehicles sold in 1994 were assembled in U.S. transplant operations, as 
compared with only 38 percent four years earlier. In light of the shift in produc- 
tion, the apparent immobility of the automotive deficit raises the question as to 
whether multinational production arrangements, such as automobile transplant 
production in the United States, ultimately have any effect on the trade balance 
between  nations. In particular,  these facts raise the question of whether the 
national identity of the firms, as opposed to production location alone, deter- 
mines international sourcing decisions. This paper begins to address this ques- 
tion by  studying the production of U.S. and foreign automobile firms in U.S. 
foreign trade zones. 
Although roughly  30 percent of  imports in general arrive through  the in- 
trafirm trade of multinationals, and the percentage is much higher in the auto 
industry, there has been  little examination of the factors shaping these flows 
and firm decisions. Among theoretical treatments of this issue, considerations 
of factor costs, increasing returns to scale in production, contracting difficult- 
ies, and the circumvention of  protection have figured prominently in the de- 
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scription of motivations for multinational activity.  I  Indeed, these rationales are 
not necessarily exclusive. Unfortunately, a dearth of firm-level data on multina- 
tional firms'  activity in trade has impeded widespread  empirical observation 
and characterization of these effects. 
This papers considers one aspect of multinational activity, the domestic con- 
tent decision of U.S. and foreign automobile firms in the United States.2 Obser- 
vation of this activity is facilitated by  the U.S. operation of the foreign trade 
zone (FTZ) program. The evidence shows that, although the domestic con- 
tent  of  U.S.  automakers is higher  overall than that  of  Japanese automobile 
firms, the difference is shrinking as the operations age. It should also be noted 
that, although Japanese manufacturers may initially have located in the United 
States for political reasons, Japanese automobile assembly operations appear 
to be affected by  relative prices, just as U.S. production  facilities are. These 
conclusions are supported by observation of domestic input content. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 discusses factors that may influ- 
ence the foreign and domestic content of automobile production in the United 
States, including the institutional  details of the U.S. foreign trade zone pro- 
gram. Section 2.2 provides a simple model of the demand for inputs, which 
links the relative demand for domestic and foreign  inputs to movements in 
factor costs. The model is then tested  in section 2.3. Concluding comments 
and discussion are presented in section 2.4, 
2.1  Foreign Trade Zones: Design and Usage 
2.1.1  Trade Flows and Multinational Activity 
The predicted  effect of multinational  activity on trade depends largely on 
the international conditions that are used to construct the model for prediction. 
For example, Helpman and Krugman (1985) describe the effects of multina- 
tional production in the context of a conventional factor model. They demon- 
strate that the presence of  multinational  production can enhance or diminish 
the volume of trade. The degree of intraindustry trade that occurs in this setting 
depends largely on the distribution of factors. Since headquarter  services are 
assumed  to be capital  intense in production, intrafirm headquarter services, 
however, flow in a single direction  and originate  from the capital abundant 
country. In  contrast, Markusen  and Venables (1995) consider an alternative 
I. For examples of these arguments, see Helpman (1984),  Markusen (1984), Ethier (1986), and 
Bhagwati et al. (1987). 
2. In addition to trade talks regarding Japanese sales and purchases in the automotive sector, 
policy concern regarding domestic content is exhibited by the American Automobile Labeling Act. 
This act requires that, as of the 1995 model year, vehicle stickers include information on the loca- 
tion of automobile assembly as well as the percentage of U.S./Canadian content. These stickers 
must also include the production location of the engine and transmission as well as the country of 
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framework in which multinational activities can originate from multiple loca- 
tions. Firms have many potential modes of operation, including existence as a 
national firm that exports to, or as a multinational firm that produces in, many 
locations. When firms decide how to serve foreign markets, they must weigh 
the opposing forces of transport and tariff costs, which impede export sales, 
against the importance of scale economies in production, which raise the cost 
of multinational activity relative to production in a single location. In the Mar- 
kusen  and  Venables  model, multinationals  initially  enhance the volume  of 
trade but may ultimately diminish the volume of trade if the multinational form 
of operation becomes increasingly prevalent over time. 
Since we observe elements of both models in the international environment, 
it is not possible to form a single prediction regarding the effect of multination- 
als on trade. It is likely that the ultimate effect of multinationals on trade vol- 
umes will depend on the characteristics of the industry as well as on the under- 
lying sources of  comparative  advantage across  countries.  In  this  case, the 
overall effects have to be observed industry by industry. 
To date, few studies have examined the importance of multinational firms in 
trade. One exception is Zeile (1995), who considers a number of measures that 
demonstrate the relative importance of U.S. value added, or parts, in multina- 
tional production.  Zeile’s results are based on a panel of multinational  firms 
operating in the United Sates. This work documents that there are significant 
differences across industries and countries in the measures of U.S. economic 
activity  associated  with  multinational  firms.  Zeile  observes  that  Japanese 
multinationals incorporate a smaller percentage U.S. content in their US.  pro- 
duction, relative to other multinationals  operating in the United States. Zeile 
suggests that this observed difference may reflect Japanese methods of subcon- 
tracting as well as the relatively high portion of Japanese firm investment that 
was greenfield as opposed to acquisition. 
An ongoing question in this literature is whether multinational activity en- 
hances  or  substitutes  for  market  service  by  export. In  one  recent  analy- 
sis, Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Kulchycky  (1988) study the case of  US.- and 
Swedish-headquartered multinationals  and  conclude that  the  activities  are 
complementary. In another study, Brainard  (1993) performs a cross-industry 
analysis, describing the relative sales of multinationals  generated by  affiliate 
activity as compared with export. This work discovers that affiliate activities 
rise in importance with transportation costs, tariffs, and other trade barriers but 
that the relative importance of affiliate activities falls when it is confronted by 
higher  barriers  to foreign investment. In addition,  Brainard  finds  that  plant 
scale and proprietary firm assets also affect the modes of serving foreign mar- 
kets, providing evidence that the relative importance of multinational activity 
conducted by  affiliates responds  to industry  characteristics.  In  light  of  this 
characterization,  this paper seeks to describe and measure the responsiveness 
of domestic content in the automobile industry. 36  Deborah L. Swenson 
2.1.2  The Foreign Trade Zone Program 
Data from the U.S. foreign trade zones program form the basis of this study. 
The foreign trade zones program was created in 1934 in an effort to encourage 
international trade in general and the reexport of products in particular. How- 
ever, the program was of little use to producers until modifications  were ren- 
dered in later years. In its initial form, the foreign trade zones program could 
not be used for production or assembly purposes. The 1950 Boggs amendment 
expanded the activities that could be performed within foreign trade zones to 
include manufacture. A second major change was a 1980  Treasury Department 
ruling that limited the dutiable value of products leaving foreign trade zones 
to the cost of the components contained in those products. 
The foreign trade zones program operates along two tiers. General purpose 
zones are available for use by most industries. Both foreign and domestic firms 
are allowed to operate within these zones. However, sensitive industries, such 
as automobiles and steel, must operate within the more regulated foreign trade 
subzone program. By the end of the 1980s, the automobile industry accounted 
for more than 80 percent of all foreign trade subzone shipments. 
It is no coincidence that all U.S. automobile assembly plants currently in the 
United States have sought and obtained foreign trade subzone status. Automo- 
bile assemblers benefit from three tariff reductions that are provided by opera- 
tion within a foreign trade zone. The most important provision is one that en- 
ables producers to reduce the tariffs they owe in the case of inverted tariffs. 
Inverted turiffs refers to the situation in which the tariff levied on intermediate 
inputs is higher than the tariff applied to the import of the final product. Nor- 
mally, firms utilizing imported components pay the tariffs associated with each 
individual component. However, if a firm produces within the boundaries of a 
foreign trade zone, the firm may elect to pay either the tariff rate assessed on 
the final good or the tariff rate that applies to the imported components. The 
obvious benefit is the firm’s ability to select the lowest of the two rates. 
Currently, the ability to reduce tariffs when an inversion exists is lauded as 
a provision that helps U.S. assemblers remain competitive with foreign assem- 
blers. A rationale for the program is elimination of the cost disadvantages that 
might face U.S. assemblers who use imported components. Suppose, for ex- 
ample, that the foreign firm produces a product with foreign parts and com- 
pletes the assembly abroad. When the product is shipped to the United States, 
it pays the tariff rate that applies to the assembled good. In cases of tariff inver- 
sion, a US.  firm, performing assembly in the United States, could pay a higher 
tariff on the same foreign components.  This ability to circumvent “inverted 
tariffs”  is particularly  important  for  producers  in  the  automobile  industry, 
where the tariff rate on finished cars is 2.5 percent and the rate on many auto- 
mobile parts ranges from 4 to 11 per~ent.~  A further tariff benefit accruing to 
3. ”Inverted tariffs” in the automobile industry originated from U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 37  Domestic Content of Japanese and U.S. Automobile Production 
zone users is the ability to delay tariff  payments. In general, firms must pay 
customs duties within ten days of a product’s entry into the United States. How- 
ever, firms located in foreign trade zones are entitled to delay payment of  cus- 
toms duties until ten days after their products have left the foreign trade zone 
for their destination markets. The magnitude of this second benefit is propor- 
tional to inventory held within the subzone. Further, for finished products that 
are exported out of the United States, no tariff is due on the imported compo- 
nents that were used in production. Finally, the presence of foreign trade zones 
provides one last benefit for automobile producers  who practice just-in-time 
production techniques. The time required for customs is reduced by as much 
as five days, enabling firms to produce more efficiently.& 
Foreign trade subzone benefits are not automatic. Automakers who wish to 
gain foreign  trade zone status for their assembly  operations  are required  to 
apply for firm-level subzone status, and they are further required to renew these 
subzone privileges  periodically. Foreign trade subzones are granted to firms 
and are attached to general purpose foreign trade zones. Hence, a firm cannot 
apply for subzone status unless there is a general purpose zone to which it can 
attach itself. As long as this qualification is met, however, there are essentially 
no moving costs entailed in the creation of a foreign trade subzone. Automak- 
ers typically request that their current manufacturing  facilities be given sub- 
zone status, and the boundaries of the subzone are defined accordingly. 
In  the larger  context, it should be mentioned  that  the foreign trade  zone 
program cannot be used to circumvent other trade policies. To begin, although 
producers have the choice of paying the lower of  the intermediate inputs tariff 
and the final product tariff on imported components, operations within a for- 
eign trade zone or subzone cannot be used to avoid the payment of antidumping 
duties. Further, although products that are reexported from trade zones pay no 
U.S. tariffs on their use of  imported components, the North American  Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is explicit that foreign trade zones cannot be used 
to avoid the payment of any North American tariffs on products that are subse- 
quently exported to Mexico or Canada. 
2.1.3  Trends in Foreign Trade Zone Usage by Automobile Producers 
A growing portion of trade in automobiles and automobile parts enters the 
United States through the foreign trade zones program. By  1993, the volume 
of  automobile trade entering foreign trade zones was over $12 billion. Over 
half this amount entered special purpose foreign trade subzones, where domes- 
tic  assembly  or  activity  was  conducted before  the  products  were  shipped 
for final sale.s Table 2.1 displays some of the trends in automakers’ usage of 
foreign trade zones. First, it is notable that more than 90 percent of the zone 
4. Products that are sourced through foreign trade .zones may move more quickly  since they 
5. Automobile activity represented 51.4 percent of all subzone foreign receipts in 199.3. In turn, 
avoid some customs clearance formalities. 
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Table 2.1  U.S. Content and US.  Shipments of FTZ Subzone Auto Assemblers 
U.S. Firms  Foreign Firms 
No. of  % Domestic  % Domestic  No. of  % Domestic  % Domestic 
Year  Sites  Shipments  Inputs  Sites  Shipments  Inputs 
1984  9 
1985  15 
1986  20 
1987  22 
1988  25 
1989  29 
1990  29 
1991  28 
1992  28 



















































Source: Foreign Trade Zones Board, annual reports; and author’s calculations 
Note: “%  domestic shipments” is the percentage of shipments from the foreign trade subzone that 
is shipped to U.S. destinations. “% domestic inputs” is the percentage of inputs entering the for- 
eign trade subzone from U.S. locations. The percentages have been weighted by zone shipments. 
shipments are destined for the domestic market whether the assembly is com- 
pleted by a U.S. or by  a foreign firm. However, the usage of domestic inputs 
by U.S. and foreign automakers differs markedly. In 1993, foreign automobile 
firms sourced two-thirds  of their  inputs from the  United  States, while U.S. 
firms sourced more than 95 percent  of their inputs from the United  States. 
Nonetheless, U.S. sourcing by foreign firms has grown dramatically. In 1984, 
foreign firms purchased only 35 percent of their inputs in the United States. 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 track individual firm usage of  automobile foreign trade 
subzones. Foreign and U.S. firms exhibit a few distinct trends in their foreign 
trade zone operations. To  begin, most domestic manufacturers had their trade 
zones  in  place  by  1988, while  foreign  firms were  continuing  to  open new 
zones. The one exception was Volkswagen. Volkswagen opened its U.S. facil- 
ity before the other foreign producers and closed its U.S. production facility in 
1988. It should also be noted  that three subzones contain international joint 
venture activity; NUMMI, Autoalliance,  and Diamond-Stac6 While there  is 
some heterogeneity in the sourcing and shipping activity between firms that 
are headquartered in the United States, or abroad, U.S. plants have uniformly 
higher domestic input content and shipping. Although the entry of  new zone 
operators obscures the overall aging process of  zone activity, it also appears 
that  foreign  firms use an increasing  percentage  of  inputs  sourced from the 
United States. 
Table 2.4 compares automobile industry activity represented by the foreign 
6. For the purposes of  this paper, zones are clasitied as an  international joint venture if the 
output from the zone results in automobiles sold under both U.S. and foreign nameplates. Table 2.2  Volume of Automobile Foreign Trade Suhzone Activity, 1984, 1988, and 1992 
~ 
1984  1988  1992 
Zonec  Inputs  Shipments  Zones  Inputs  Shipments  Zonez  Input\  Shipments 
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Source: Foreign Trade Zones Board, annual reports; and author's  calculations. 
Nure: Zones represented include assemblers and parts makers. All input and shipment values are deflated to 1982 dollars. 
,'Joint ventures between US.  and Japanese partners. Table 2.3  Sourcing and Shipping Activities of Automobile Foreign Trade Subzones, 1984, 1988, and 1992 
1984  1988  1992 
Zones  % Domestic  % Domestic  Zones  % Domestic  % Domestic  Zones  % Domestic  % Domestic 
(No.)  Inputs  Shipments  (No.)  Inputs  Shipments  (No.)  Inputs  Shipments 
GM  0  10  94.4  92.1  16  97.3  93.3 
Ford  7  85.9  92.8  10  84.7  91.6  10  90.9  93.1 
Toyota  0  I  48.5  86.  I  1  66.  I  88.8 
Volkswagen  I  63.8  87.7  1  35.4  91 .0  0 
Chrysler  3  92.1  86.3  6  87.3  87.4  6  95.1  91.8 
Nissan  1  20.0  99.8  1  32.8  99.9  1  52.0  94.8 
Honda  1  29.6  97.7  1  60.7  96.9  2  83.7  89.  I 
Subaru-Isuzu  0  0  1  59.9  98.7 
JV*  0  2  31.7  93.6  3  57.9  87.9 
Total  13  84.1  90.1  32  82.9  91.3  40  87.5  92.0 
Source: Foreign Trade Zones Board, annual reports; and author’s calculations 
Nore; Zones represented include assemblers and parts makers. Firm averages weight plant observations by plant shipments. 
dJoint  ventures between U.S. and Japanese partners. Table 2.4  U.S. Imports Shipped to Affiliates, 1992 
Shipped by Foreigners  Shipped by Foreign Parent Group 
% Goods for Resale  % Goods  % Goods for Resale  % Goods 
Total  W Capital  without Further  for Further  Total  W Capital  without Further  for Further 
($million)  Equipment  Manufacture  Manufacture  ($million)  Equipment  Manufacture  Manufacture 
All industries  182,152  .945  69.995  29.059  134,292  ,685  74.258  25.057 
Manufacturing  50,919  1.601  28.592  69.805  34,40 1  1.576  30.563  67.861 
Transportation 
equipment  5,665  3.513  16.452  80.035  4,882  4.035  16.459  79.496 
Wholesale trade  109,833  . I44  93.320  6.536  88,761  ,169  92.414  7.417 
Motor vehicles 
and equipment  34,524  ,113  90.974  8.913  28,644  ,136  89.806  10.054 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1994, table G-35) 42  Deborah L. Swenson 
trade zones data set of this paper with aggregate trade statistics and with other 
industries. It is not possible to provide an exact match since the Department of 
Commerce classification  system places foreign automakers under one of two 
different categories rather than under a single category that encompasses these 
firms’ automotive production activity. In particular, the Department of Com- 
merce classifies each foreign firm according to its primary line of business. In 
this taxonomy, some automotive firms are designated as manufacturing, while 
others are designated as wholesale trade. As with manufacturing  in general, 
the bulk of imports brought to affiliates in the transportation equipment sector 
is used  for further manufacture.  However, in contrast  with the manufactur- 
ing aggregate, the transportation sector imports capital equipment in twice the 
proportion. Nonetheless, the transportation  equipment sector imports capital 
equipment at the low amount of 3.5 percent of affiliate imports. The transporta- 
tion sector sources a much higher percentage of its imports shipped to affiliates 
directly  from the  foreign  parent,  relative  to  the  manufacturing  sector  as  a 
whole. 
To date, no work has been done on the foreign trade zones program. How- 
ever, work has examined the Overseas Assembly Provision (OAP). This pro- 
gram is similar in that it is meant to mitigate tariff-induced disadvantages faced 
by U.S. component makers. When the United States imports products that are 
assembled  abroad,  the  OAP exempts  from duty  that  portion  of  the  US.- 
imported final product that can be attributed to U.S. components. The general 
finding in this area, as demonstrated by Finger (1976) and Mendez (1993), is 
that the OAP has increased the activity of  US.  parts industries at the same 
time that it has reduced the activities of U.S. assemblers.’ 
2.2  A Model of Zone Usage 
To  motivate the empirical work that follows, we construct a stylized model 
to describe the demand for auto components of domestic and foreign origin. 
For expositional ease, the notation and explanations that follow consider repre- 
sentative U.S. and Japanese firms that are both producing in and selling to the 
U.S. market. In fact, it is assumed that multinational firms exist in equilibrium 
at all times, although the volume of their activities may change. 
Multinational  firms are assumed to use both domestic and foreign  inputs 
in their production processes according to a constant elasticity of substitution 
production function. The output of a typical  US. firm,  Yus,  is a function of 
U.S. inputs, Xus, and Japanese inputs, X,.  Each of  the Nus varieties of U.S. 
inputs and N, varieties of Japanese inputs enters the production function sym- 
metrically, and the elasticity of substitution between any two inputs is u 
7. Grossrnan (1982) shows that the OAP may actually cause intraindustry trade in homogeneous 
products, as domestic and foreign producers may perceive differential input costs. 43  Domestic Content of Japanese and US. Automobile Production 
Japanese firms producing  in the United States are also expected to have a 
constant elasticity of substitution production function, which reflects the out- 
put generated by the U.S. and Japanese inputs entered into the production pro- 
cess. However, since Japanese firms are headquartered  in Japan, we introduce 
the possibility that Japanese firms use U.S. inputs less efficiently than they do 
Japanese inputs8  The differential efficiency related to the use of non-Japanese 
inputs is captured by the term 8us.  It is assumed that 0 < 6,,  < l.9  Hence, the 
overall Japanese production function is as follows: 
yJ = (~,~N,~Xu~~l-l~u)  + N X  ~l-l~m~]l~~l-l~ml 
JJ 
Firms maximize profits, taking input prices into consideration. The price of 
a typical U.S. part is Pus, while the price of a representative Japanese part is 
P,. In light of the production technology, the respective demands for U.S. in- 
puts by Japanese and U.S. producers in the United States are 
xUS,J  = s~S(p~GG/pUS)"yJ;  xU,.lJS  = (py~G/pUS)uyUS~ 
At the same time, the respective demands for Japanese inputs by Japanese and 
US.  producers in the United States are determined by 
Xj,j = (PJ,GG/P,)"Yj;  X,,,,  = (P~&JPj)mY~s. 
It  is important to note that the composite price of inputs, PAGG,  differs for 
Japanese and U.S. firms in a fashion that reflects any differential efficiency in 
the utilization of parts sourced from different locations. In particular, the ag- 
gregate price that applies to Japanese parts demand places a weight on US. 
parts prices that is less than or equal to the weight placed on U.S. parts prices 
by U.S. producers: 
J  [p~;I.,  + p"-  m)  1/11 -(r) 
J]' 
-  [fjm pcl-ml  + p(l-m)]l/(l-mJ.  ,  Py& =  pitic -  us  us 
The value of U.S. content in Japanese production depends on the price and 
variety of U.S. inputs used as well as the quantities of each variety demanded 
by Japanese producers. We can now compare the value of U.S. input content 
to the total value of inputs used by Japanese firms through the following calcu- 
lation: 
Pus  NUSXUS  -  -  S.,S 
PusNusXus + PJNJXJ  8;s  + (Nj/N"s)(P".JPj)a-' 
As one would expect, the relative value of U.S. content is rising in the Japanese 
price of inputs and declining with increases in the U.S. price of  inputs. It is 
8. Bergsten and Noland (1993) describe how the method of supplier contracting in Japan may 
increase the proclivity of Japanese assemblers for Japanese parts produced by suppliers with whom 
they have ongoing arrangements. 
9. It is possible that US.  firms also have a differential efficiency in their use of  U.S. and foreign 
inputs. Incorporation of this idea would only strengthen the conclusions that follow. Further expla- 
nation of the 6,,  term will be provided in the following section. 44  Deborah L. Swenson 
important to note as well that the Japanese price expressed in dollars is gener- 
ated by the price in yen multiplied by the exchange rate, P, = e X P:. 
Since a  high  portion  of  components purchases  are intrafirm  in  nature, 
whether the parts are produced in the United States or abroad, it is assumed 
that the parts are priced  at marginal cost. It is possible  that  there are scale 
economies that are present in the production of intermediate inputs. However, 
this possibility is excluded here in order to prevent cost feedback that affects 
total demand. More discussion of product demand is included in the follow- 
ing section. 
The U.S. content embodied in U.S. production  takes  a similar form, and 
prices  exert  influence  in  a  comparable  fashion,  as  is  shown  in  the  final 
equation: 
In light of this set of equations, the following conclusions emerge. First, for 
a given set of Japanese and U.S. prices, the US. content of U.S. firm produc- 
tion will be higher than that of Japanese firms. In fact, this situation will be 
exacerbated  if  U.S.  firms use Japanese inputs less efficiently than Japanese 
firms do since the preference for own-country inputs will be strengthened. Sec- 
ond, if the dollar depreciates, the domestic content embodied in either U.S. or 
Japanese production  should rise since dollar depreciation  causes the relative 
price of U.S. inputs to fall. 
However, it is possible  that Japanese production  might not respond to ex- 
change rate  movements.  Japanese motivation  for producing in  the  United 
States could arise from the desire to gain North American content or the desire 
to circumvent protectionist moves in the United States.Io  Additionally, the need 
to fulfill content requirements for other tariff privileges might also modify the 
sourcing plans of firms. If so, these motives related to the degree of protection 
and form of regulation could cause the domestic content of Japanese produc- 
tion to be much higher than the preceding set of equations indicates.  'I If Japan 
were maintaining a certain level of domestic content in the United  States to 
achieve these alternative objectives, then one would expect that the level of 
U.S. content would not change with exchange rate movements since content 
would be held to the minimum threshold needed to satisfy the requirement. 
2.3  Data and Estimation 
In this section, I test the model of parts purchases that was developed in the 
previous section. It is important to emphasize that the test is one that examines 
10. This IS the situation described by Bhagwati et al. (1987). 
1 I. For discussions of  content regulations, see Lopez-de-Silanes, Markusen, and Rutherford 
(1993) or Krishna and Krueger (1995). 45  Domestic Content of Japanese and U.S. Automobile Production 
the location from which components are sourced as opposed to the nationality 
of  the party from whom the components are purchased.'2 In particular,  I am 
seeking to discover the responsiveness of firms in their decision to buy U.S. or 
foreign parts. In all cases, I am seeking to explain the percentage of total in- 
puts, p.,  that are of domestic origin. The first set of tests follows the functional 
form that is proposed by the model and is estimated by nonlinear least squares. 
However, the results are subsequently estimated by tobit, in order to examine 
the sensitivity of the results to functional form and to augment the regressors. 
The preceding  section suggests that domestic input content is determined 
by relative prices of inputs, the variety of inputs, and firm preferences. Hence, 
the estimating equation that is used in this section assumes the form 
The relative efficiency of using U.S. parts is measured by &.  In the case of 
U.S.-headquartered firms, S,,  is set equal to one. In the case of foreign firms, 
the value of S,,  is estimated. The relative number of Japanese parts and US. 
parts, N,/N,,,  is also set equal to one rather than estimated.13  Hence, the estima- 
tion that proceeds from this point is the determination of the elasticity of sub- 
stitution  and the degree of  discount, if  any, that foreign producers  associate 
with  the  use  of  U.S.  parts. The purchase of  domestic  and foreign inputs is 
collected from the annual reports of the Foreign Trade Zones Board and is used 
to construct the measure of domestic content. The price of U.S. parts relative 
to Japanese parts is proxied alternatively by the relative automotive wage rates 
in the two countries and by the exchange rate. 
2.3.1  Joint Venture Production 
Before continuing, there is one last data issue to be resolved. In particular, 
there were three international joint ventures by the conclusion of the estimation 
period. For the purposes of this paper, joint ventures are deemed to be facilities 
that produce models that are sold under both U.S.  and foreign name~1ates.I~ 
Table 2.5 experiments with the classification of  these U.S./foreign joint ven- 
tures to see whether they can be classified as a unique hybrid or whether these 
operations are more similar to either U.S. or foreign automobile production. 
Columns 1 and 2 analyze two subsets of the data and assume that the estimated 
elasticity of substitution is the same for all types of automaker. In column  1, 
joint ventures are compared with pure foreign automakers  operating  in  the 
12. However, Zeile (1995) shows that 94.6 percent of automobile firm imports are intrafirm. 
13. Attempts were made to estimate the ratio of Japanese to U.S. parts, but the results were too 
large to be sensible. Also, since there are fully integrated automobile assemblers in both the United 
States and Japan, it seems likely that the relative number of parts types should differ drastically. 
14. This restrictive definition of joint venture excludes Subam-Isuzu, which involves two Japa- 
nese firms. However, none of its output is sold under a U.S.  nameplate. 46  Deborah L. Swenson 
Table 2.5  Domestic Input Content and Firm Qpe, 1984-93 
u. group 
u. United States 
(T,  foreign 
D, joint venture (JV) 
(r. foreigdJV,' 
8. foreign 
8. joint venture 
Adjusted R' 
N 
1.838  2.670 





,763  ,797 



































Norr; Estimates are by  nonlinear least squares. Standard errors are in parentheses. Joint ventures 
represent twenty-two year-firm observations. 
"The elasticity of the foreign and joint venture observations estimated jointly. 
United States.  The results indicate a slight difference; the pure foreign ventures 
exhibit an apparent discount on their use of domestic parts relative to the joint 
venture manufacturers. In column 2, the joint venture producers are compared 
with U.S. producers. The results suggest that joint venture producers discount 
the use of U.S. parts relative to U.S. makers. 
Columns 3 and 4 repeat the subset groupings that were tested in the first two 
columns of table 2.5. However, the estimation now relaxes the assumption that 
all automakers have the same elasticity of substitution. Instead, each type of 
automaker is allowed  to have a unique elasticity  of  substitution.  Column 4 
reveals that the joint venture producers appear to be less flexible than the U.S. 
makers, as is shown by their estimated elasticity of  substitution of 2.25. It is 
shown as well that the joint venture makers appear to place a discount on U.S.- 
sourced parts relative to the U.S. firms. 
Finally, the entire sample is tested in columns 5 and 6 of  table 2.5. Here, 
each type of  firm is allowed to have its own elasticity  of  substitution  in its 
purchasing of parts. In column 5, it is assumed that no discount applies to the 
foreign purchase of  U.S.  parts. This column shows that U.S.  firms have an 
estimated elasticity of substitution that is more than 50 percent larger than the 
estimated elasticity of foreign or  joint venture firms. In column 6, it is assumed 
that foreign firms and joint ventures have a common elasticity of substitution 
but that they may have different discount rates in their use of U.S. parts. Again, 
the estimated elasticity for US.  firms is much higher than that for the foreign 
or joint venture firms in the sample. On the other hand, the estimated discount 47  Domestic Content of Japanese and U.S. Automobile Production 
Table 2.6  Domestic Input Content and Firm Characteristics, 1984-93 
Production Type  Production Volume  Number of  Models 
Assembler  Parts 
(1)  (2) 
u, United States  2.692  2.749 
u,  foreign/JV  2.388  -1.951 
6, foreign/JV  ,853  .8 13 
(.451)  (1.021) 
(.867)  (4.469) 

















More  2 or 
than 2  Fewer 
2.670  2.719 
(.632)  (.639) 
4.763  2.335 
(4.307)  (.965) 
,762  ,966 
(.081)  (.103) 
Adjusted R'  ,792  ,784  ,781  ,812  ,787  .799 
N  295  46  189  106  146  149 
Note: Estimates are by  nonlinear least squares. Standard errors are in parentheses. Production volume is 
deemed high if the number of cars produced in the calendar year was 207,000 or higher. Low volume 
represents output below that threshold. Number of models counts the number of  automobile nameplate 
vehicles produced within the individual zones. JV = joint venture. 
factors of  foreign and joint venture  operators are very  close in  magnitude. 
Since the joint venture  firms have elasticities  that are similar in  magnitude 
to the pure foreign firm elasticities, the following estimation assumes that the 
foreign firm and joint venture observations can be classified together as  for- 
eign. The specification further assumes that foreign and joint venture produc- 
ers have the same discount factor in their use of U.S. parts. 
Table 2.6 investigates a number of  subsets  in  the data in  order to gauge 
whether any of the factors provide meaningful insight into the estimated elas- 
ticities of  substitution or the input discount factor, 6. Columns 1 and 2 separate 
the assembly zones from zones that specialize in the production  of parts. Al- 
though the elasticity of substitution for U.S. firms is virtually identical to the 
previous  estimates, the results show that foreign or joint venture assemblers 
have a higher elasticity of substitution than was estimated in the previous table. 
However, a differential still remains. 
Columns 3 and 4 distinguish the automobile assemblers by production vol- 
ume. Automobile zones producing 207,000 or more vehicles per calender year 
were deemed high volume, and zones producing fewer vehicles were classified 
as low volume. Automobile firms are broken out according to production vol- 
ume since the automobile industry is known for its high fixed costs of produc- 
tion. We might assume that a firm with high production volume would be more 
sensitive to cost changes than a low-volume firm  since the low-volume firm 
could not justify producing parts in multiple locations even if relative prices 
changed. This reluctance would be most pronounced in the case of engine or 
transmission  production,  where fixed costs are especially  high, causing reli- 
ance on scale production. 
Data on automobile zone volume was collected by  matching  each foreign 48  Deborah L. Swenson 
trade zone with the automobile plant data published in the Automotive News 
Market Data Book. During the sample period, the median U.S. assembly site 
plant (both foreign trade zone and non-foreign  trade zone) produced 207,000 
vehicles. Of those plants producing within a zone, the median number of ve- 
hicles produced was 227,000.  I5 These results suggest that foreign and domestic 
assemblers have similar elasticities of  substitution but that the notable differ- 
ences emerge from the low-volume sample. In the low-volume sample, U.S. 
firms are much more responsive to exchange rate-induced  price changes than 
are foreign producers in the United States. 
Finally, the data are separated according to the number of nameplate vehicle 
types produced in each zone. The rationale for this separation is to see whether 
the difference in foreign and domestic elasticities relates to the fact that foreign 
zones typically produce fewer car models in each zone than do U.S. producers. 
Column 5 includes all assemblers who produce three or more vehicle types in 
a zone, and column 6 includes all those with two or fewer vehicle nameplates. 
Vehicle diversity cannot be excluded as a determinant of U.S.-foreign  differ- 
ences. However, the imprecision of the estimated foreign elasticity makes it 
difficult to draw conclusions as to whether production diversity plays a role. 
2.3.2  Tobit Estimates 
Although the previous estimates have the advantage of  following directly 
from the model of parts demand and result in direct estimates of the elasticity 
of substitution, they suffer from a few drawbacks. The main reason for using 
tobit analysis here is to see how estimated domestic content responds to price 
changes when a larger set of firm characteristics is considered. It is true that 
the elasticity of demand could be estimated as a function of plant age or other 
characteristics. However, results were not stable or precisely estimated when 
this was performed  with this paper’s data set. The estimating  equation now 
takes the form 
p = a + aus  -  pe + yX + 5. 
As before,  content varies  over time  as  relative  prices  change.  These price 
changes are captured alternatively by exchange rate movements, measured by 
e, and later by the direct measurement  of factor input prices. Now, however, 
the level of U.S. content in production also depends on a U.S. shift term, aUs, 
and firm characteristics, X. The error term is measured by 5. 
Table 2.7 provides a baseline estimate in column 1. As expected, the results 
show that  the average  U.S.  firm  utilizes  31.5 percent  more domestic  value 
added than does the average foreign firm. This baseline estimate assumes fur- 
ther that all firms react similarly to exchange rate movements, and the esti- 
mated effect again confirms that dollar depreciation causes the share of U.S. 
inputs to rise. Column 2 adds another indicator variable to capture differences 
15. The numbers are different because some firms were slower to open zones than others. 49  Domestic Content of Japanese and U.S. Automobile Production 
Table 2.7  Auto Production in U.S. Foreign Trade Zones, 198493 
(dependent variable: domestic inputsltotal inputs) 
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(.010) 
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34  1 
156.5 1 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses 
between parts makers and assemblers. While the results are qualitatively simi- 
lar to the baseline estimates, the estimation finds that parts makers have domes- 
tic content that is roughly  16 percent lower than that of assemblers. 
Column 3 introduces  the possibility  that foreign and domestic firms may 
have different responses  to the movement  of the exchange rate and actually 
suggests that the response  is higher for the foreign firms in the sample. The 
specification also includes measures of the zone’s age, where age is the number 
of years of  zone operation. The age variable used applies only to the case of 
foreign firms. When age was included more generally, the estimated effects 
varied substantially and were not precisely estimated. It is likely that the age 
of the subzone activity is more meaningful in the case of  foreign operations 
since they are more recently opened. Here we find that foreign firms source an 
increasing portion of their parts from the United States as their zones age but 
that the level of growth diminishes over time. 
Column 4 adds another control for the total shipment size of the zones. It is 
learned that  zones with higher shipments use a greater  percentage of  U.S. 
parts. The inclusion of this regressor brings the value of  the foreign response 
to the exchange rate back down to a magnitude that is slightly smaller than that 
of U.S.  firms. Finally, column 5 estimates firm fixed effects. The results are 
qualitatively similar to the previous specification. Overall, the results suggest 50  Deborah L. Swenson 
Table 2.8  Auto Production in U.S. Foreign Trade Zones, 1984-93 
(dependent variable: domestic inputsltotal inputs) 
United States 
Relative wage 
Relative energy cost 

























































Note; Standard errors are given in parentheses 
that  many  of  the observed  differences between  foreign  and U.S.  firms are 
caused by age and production volume differences. 
Rather than relying solely on the exchange rate to proxy for relative price 
effects, I now work  with specifications that include a number of prices that 
should directly affect the costs of production  in the auto industry. Table 2.8 
sequentially  adds measures  of  ore costs and energy costs to the estimating 
equations. Each of the results implies that a rise in the relative cost of labor in 
the United States will reduce the domestic content of U.S.-produced  automo- 
biles. In contrast, relative energy and iron prices enter with a perverse positive 
coefficient. This suggests that the use of domestic inputs relative to total inputs 
increases when the U.S.  prices of these inputs rise.  However, none of these 
estimates are significant. And, importantly, the continued US. indicator vari- 
able shows that U.S. firms utilize 30 percent greater levels of domestic inputs, 
even after controls have been added for input prices. It is the relative price of 
labor that plays the most decisive role in parts sourcing decisions. 
2.3.3  Specification Checks 
Table 2.9 examines the tobit estimating assumption that the regression errors 
are homoskedastic. Since the errors could be related to firm  size, the first two 
columns divide the dependent variable, percentage  domestic content, first by 
the square root of shipment size and next by the square root of zone production 
volume. While the first normalization  provides  results that  are qualitatively 
similar to earlier tobit analysis, the second, based on production volume, does 51  Domestic Content of Japanese and U.S. Automobile Production 
Table 2.9  Specification Tests (dependent variable: domestic inputs/total inputs) 
High Volume  Low Volume 
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Nore: Tobit estimation. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The dependent variable is divided 
by the square root of total shipments in col. 1. It is divided by the square root of production volume 
and multiplied by  ten  in  col. 2. Columns 3 and 5  are relative to the all production median of 
207,000 units. Columns 4 and 6 are relative to the all FTZ production median of  227,529 units. 
not. A further difference between columns 1 and 2 is that production volume 
applies only to automobile assemblers who produce completed vehicles. Since 
total shipments represents the dollar value of shipments, it includes parts mak- 
ers and assemblers. 
Under the assumption that there will be less heteroskedasticity  of errors if 
data are analyzed according to production volume subsets, the tobit analysis is 
redone on subsamples of  the data that are classified as high or low volume. 
As was learned previously, in the nonlinear least squares estimates, the biggest 
apparent differences appear when low-volume producers are compared. How- 
ever, this result is sensitive to the volume classification selected:  median  of 
all automobile production or median of all foreign trade subzone production. 
Nonetheless, in three of the four estimates of price responsiveness in columns 
3-6,  U.S. firms exhibit greater sensitivity in all but column 5. And this result 
is robust to the inclusion of firm age effects, which were found to affect the 
price responsiveness. 
2.4  Conclusions 
This paper studies the domestic content decisions of domestic and foreign 
automobile makers in the United States between 1984 and 1993. The results 52  Deborah L. Swenson 
show that, although the domestic content of Japanese firms has risen over time, 
differences are not being eliminated completely. Also, the apparent elasticity 
of substitution is lower for Japanese than for U.S. firms. If one assumes that 
the demand for Japanese nameplate automobiles will remain roughly constant, 
regardless of assembly location, these results suggest that, although transplant 
production may reduce the U.S. automotive deficit with Japan, it will not elimi- 
nate it. 
The fact that the relative domestic input content of automakers responds to 
relative production costs provides two implications for multinational activity. 
To begin, this sensitivity to relative costs suggests that foreign automakers are 
not purely  motivated by  the goal of circumventing  U.S. trade restrictions.  If 
this  were the single reason  for transplant  activity in  the United States, we 
would expect the degree of U.S. content to be kept to a minimum that would 
not change with external conditions.  Next, some studies,  such as Klein and 
Rosengren  (1994), claim that foreign investment outlays are not measurably 
altered by movements in relative wages. It may be true that foreign investment 
outlays do not respond to relative wage movements, but it would be incorrect 
to infer that no other real activities were affected. These results suggest that 
real  wage  movements  may  nonetheless have  important  consequences since 
multinationals can adjust their activities along other margins such as domestic 
versus foreign content. Further work is needed to provide an integrated under- 
standing  of  the  various  margins along which  multinational  activity  is con- 
ducted. 
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